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AB HAND LUNGEN
&quot;Takings&quot; jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme
Court: The Past 10 Years
Gregory S.Alexandee
I. Introduction
No area of American property law has been more controversial in re-
cent years than the government regulation of uses of private property. No
aspect of American constitutional law more sharply poses the dilemma
about the legitimate powers of the regulatory state than the requirement
that the government pay compensation for takings of property. The pur-
pose of this essay is to acquaint the non-American legal scholar who is
unfamiliar with the recent developments in the United States Supreme
Court&apos;s &quot;takings&quot; jurisprudence. The essay does not presuppose any
background knowledge about either American constitutional or property
law. Instead it attempts to familiarize those who are interested in compar-
ative constitutional law with the major changes in this increasingly impor-
tant area of American public law.
Several American commentators, particularly in the media, have argued
that the past decade has witnessed a &quot;revolution&quot; in American takings
law.1 This essay will argue that while significant changes have occurred in
takings doctrine, it is vastly premature to conclude that these changes
* Professor of Law, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. This essay was delivered at a
seminar of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
Heidelberg, Germany, while the author was a Visiting Fellow there. He wishes to thank the
staff of the Max Planck Institute, particularly co-director, Prof. Dr. Jochen F r o w e 1 n, for
their extraordinary hospitality and intellectual stimulation.
I See the newspaper articles cited in William W F i s h e r I 11, The Significance of Pub-
lic Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774, 1774 nn. 2-3 (1988).
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amount to anything like a doctrinal revolution. Too much of the preexist-
ing doctrinal structure remains intact, and too many important questions
remain unresolved to warrant such a conclusion. A more balanced char-
acterization of the current state of takings jurisprudence in the U.S. Su-
preme Court is that it is unsettled and increasingly contentious.
H. Background., The Pre-1987 Doctrinal Landscape
Before surveying the recent developments, it will be useful first to
sketch the state of constitutional doctrine as it stood prior to 1987. That
was the year in which the Supreme Court decided a quartet of cases that
initiated the so-called takings revolution.2 To evaluate whether the recent
decisions truly constitute a change of such proportions, we need first to
be clear about what preceded them.
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is a complex and multi-
faceted provision. With respect to constitutional protection of property,
its text is beguilingly simple. It merely states that the government (both
federal and state) shall not &quot;take property&quot; for &quot;public use&quot; without pay-
ing &quot;just compensation.&quot; That simple text obscures the hard questions.
Those questions are: (1) What actions by the government constitute &quot;tak-
ings&quot; of property? (2) What interests count as &quot;property&quot; for constitu-
tional purposes? (3) What uses of property are &quot;public&quot; uses? (4) What
does the requirement of &quot;just&quot; compensation require? Of these four ques-
tions, the most intractable have been the first two. While the second two
are not unimportant, they have been less controversial and are more eas-
ily described. Let us begin with these relatively simpler matters, then, be-
fore proceeding to the more complex questions.
A. The Public-Use Requirement
Under the Fifth Amendment, the state may legitimately exercise its
power of eminent domain to expropriate a person&apos;s property, even with
payment of compensation, only if it does so for some public purpose. A
compensated condemnation of property for private purposes is unconsti-
tutional.
2 The cases are Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); First English Evangelical Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 30 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); and Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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How much does this public-use requirement in fact restrict the state&apos;s
eminent domain power? The short answer is &quot;very little.&quot; As one com-
mentator has noted, &quot;[M]ost observers today think the public use limita-
tion is a dead letter.&quot;3 The most recent Supreme Court decision on this re-
quirement indicates why this is so. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid-
the Court upheld a Hawaii statute that authorized tenants inkiff 4
developments of five acres or more to condemn their landlords&apos; owner-
ship interest and thereby acquire full ownership themselveS.5 The Court
specifically concluded that the statute satisfied the public-use require-
ment, reasoning that the statute was aimed at &quot;[rlegulating oligopoly and
the evils associated with It.,,6 The test that the Court used provides little,
if any, basis for invalidating condemnations on public-use grounds.
&quot;[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose,&quot; justice O&apos;Connor wrote, &quot;the
Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Pub-
lic Use Clause. ,7 While academic commentators have proposed interest-
ing and at least plausible theories of the public-use requirement that
would add some teeth to it,8 there seems little prospect that the Court will
adopt any of these theories in the near future. Consequently, one can
largely ignore this requirement.
B. &quot;Just Compensation&quot;
Turning to the requirement of just compensation, the Supreme Court
has held that &quot;just&quot; compensation does not necessarily mean full compen-
sation. It means that the owner is entitled to the full market value of the
property interest which has been taken from him, not the value that he at-
taches to it. Judge Posner recently explained the difference:
U]ust compensation has been held to be satisfied by payment of market
value Compensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full compen-
sation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches
to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his
property.9
3 Thomas M e r r i 11, The Economics of Public Use, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 61 (1986).
4 467 U.S.229 (1984).
5 Haw. Rev. Stat. secs. 516-22 - 516-23 (1976).
6 467 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 241.
11 See Merrill, note 3.
9 Coniston Corp v. Village ofHoffman Estates, 844f.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
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The reason that the Court has given for confining compensation to
market value rather than full personal value is that personal valuation
would create insuperable &quot;practical difficulties. &quot;l 0 Commentators have
proposed various methods of dealing with these practical problems,&apos; 1 but,
as with the public-use requirement, there seems little likelihood that the
Court will change its view anytime in the near future.
C. Has &quot;Property&quot; Been &quot;Taken&quot;?
We come, then, to the two questions that are at the heart of the current
controversy over takings doctrine, what interests constitute property for
constitutional purposes, and what governmental acts constitute takings.
The current Court has tended to collapse the distinction between these
two questions, although, as we will see, it is increasingly important to
keep them analytically distinct.
In the regulatory state determining whether the government has taken
some private property without paying compensation becomes most
acutely difficult and most politically charged in the context of those gov-
ernmental acts that formally are mere regulations of property use, that is,
actions that are purportedly exercises of the state&apos;s so-called &quot;police
power,&quot; for which no compensation is required, rather than its power of
eminent domain, which does require compensatio,n. If the line between
compensable takings and non-compensable regulations was drawn strictly
on the basis of the formal character of the government action, of course,
there would be little protection under the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The state could nearly always avoid the compensa-
tion requirement merely by characterizing its action as a regulation rather
than an expropriation. For the Fifth Amendment to have any teeth, there
has to be some recognition of the fact that some acts that formally are
mere regulations in fact are expropriations. American constitutional law
reflects this awareness in the crucial doctrine known as the &quot;regulatory
taking.&quot; It is no exaggeration to say that the American law of takings to-
day has become virtually synonymous with &quot;regulatory takings.&quot;
10 United States v. 564.54 Acres o Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).f
See, e.g., Merrill, note 3, 82-85, 90-92; Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi.L. Rev.
681, 736-737 (1973).
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The first case to recognize the regulatory taking doctrine was the fa-
mous case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,12 decided in 1922. In that
case, justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated that a purported exer-
cise of the state&apos;s police power becomes a taking when it &quot;goes too far.&quot;
Since that case, the Court has not made much headway in specifying the
parameters of regulatory takings, but it has made so me progress.
Until 1987, there were two, but only two, categories of regulations that
triggered rules of per se unconstitutional takings. These were the &quot;perma-
nent physical occupation&quot; and the &quot;nuisance-abatement&quot; categories.
Under the first rule, a per se taking occurs whenever a regulation au-
thorizes the state or someone acting under the state&apos;s authority to occupy
the owner&apos;s property physically and permanently. That this rule is a true
per se rule is indicated by the fact that a taking will be found in such sit-
uations regardless of how slight the degree of occupation, trivial the effect
of the owner, or how important the need for the occupation. In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,13 the Supreme Court, speaking
through justice Thurgood Marshall, stated that the per se rule was quite
narrow. Until recently, it has been. To trigger the per se rule, the occupa-
tion must be direct and it must be permanent. This is why, for example,
in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,14 no per se taking was found
when a state law required owners of private shopping centers to allow
members of the public to enter their shopping centers for purposes of dis-
tributing leaflets. The state-authorized occupation, although direct and
physical, was only temporary, the Court reasoned. The effect of the three
requirements that the occupation be direct, physical, and permanent was
to make the scope of this per se rule exceedingly narrow.
The other per se rule is one of per se validity, rather than invalidity.
This rule concerns regulations that are designed to prevent a public nui-
sance. Under this rule, government actions that abate a public nuisance are
never held to be takings. The theory is that the range of legally-protected
behavior that private ownership confers on individuals does not include
the power to harm the public.15 When the state acts to prevent such be-
havior, then, it does not take any property right that the owner had in the
12 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
13 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
14 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
15 See, e.g., Miller v. Scboene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacbeck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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first place. The problem with this rule, of course, as several commentators
have pointed oUt,16 is that public-harm prevention and public-benefit
conferring (to which the per se rule of validity does not apply) are two
sides of the same coin. Every regulation that prevents a harm to the pub-
lic by definition confers a benefit on the public. The characterization of a
regulation as &quot;harm-preventing,&quot; then, is a conclusion, not a reason. Un-
til recently, the Court has never explained how this distinction can be
drawn in a principled way.
As to all other regulatory actions, the Court has used a very different
method of analysis. Eschewing per se rules, the Court has engaged in a
process of reasoning that it has itself characterized as one of &quot;essentially
ad hoc factual inquir[y].-17 While ad hoc, however, the Court&apos;s analysis
has not been entirely formless. It has focused on three factors: (1) the
character of the governmental action; (2) the extent to which the regula-
tion interferes with what the Court calls &quot;distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations&quot;; and (3) the degree of diminution in value.
1. The Character of the Governmental Action
Joseph S i n g e r has succinctly and aptly explained the first factor. &quot;The
&apos;character of the government action,&apos;&quot; S i n g e r states, &quot;concerns the issue
of whether the regulation is more closely analogous to a physical invasion
or seizure of a core property right [on the one hand] or [on the other
hand] to a general regulatory program affecting numerous parcels and de-
signed to protect the public from harm by adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote the common good.-18 There was some
indication in the Court&apos;s opinion in the 1978 case of Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City ofNew York that the harmful character of the con-
duct that the regulation proscribes is no longer important, or at least that
it is less important than it once was. As we shall see, however, that has
turned out to be a false signal.
16 The classic discussion of the problem is Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of &quot;Just Compensation&quot; Law, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1196-1197 (1972).
17 Penn Central TransportatiOn Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
18 Joseph William S i n g e r, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices (Boston, MA
1993),1228.
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2. &quot;Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations&quot;
The phrase, &quot;distinct investment-backed expectations,&quot; as well as the
concept that the phrase described, were first developed by Frank Mi-
chelman in his justly celebrated 1967 article entitled &quot;Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of &apos;Just Compen-
sation&apos; Law.&quot;19 The basic idea that the phrase is intended to suggest is that
the owner&apos;s reliance interest merits particular attention. A taking is more
likely to be found where the regulation interferes with an investment that
the owner had already made in reliance on a preexisting regulatory re-
gime, rather than frustrating some future, yet uncrystallized plan or in-
vestment opportunity that the owner had contemplated. This factor has
not appeared in the Supreme Court&apos;s analysis before the Court recognized
it in the Penn Central case, but since then it has played a prominent role.20
3. Diminution in Market Value
The third factor to which the Court has paid attention in its, balancing
analysis is the extent to which the regulation resulted in a diminution in
the market value of the owner&apos;s property interest. The idea here, of
course, is that if a regulation effects a substantial diminution in value, it
will be treated as a de facto expropriation. Two problems have plagued
this factor from the time when the Court first introduced it in the 1922
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mabon decision. The first problem is determin-
ing the relevant property interest that is the basis for calculating the de-
gree of diminution. The test requires that the Court compare the market
value of that interest with the value of the remaining property interest in
order to determine the percentage or fraction of diminution. But what is
the relevant denominator of the fraction? Is it the entire bundle of rights
that the owner initially held or only that discrete interest that the regula-
tion has affected? If the former is chosen, then the degree of diminution
will usually be less. If it is the latter, then the degree of diminution may
approach one hundred percent. The second problem with this factor is
what degree of diminution is too much. How does one determine in a
19 See note 16 supra.
20 See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 U.S.211 (1986); Ruckels-
baus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979).
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principled way at what point diminution in market value becomes consti-
tutionally impermissible?
Until quite recently, neither of these factors has been terribly impor-
tant. The Court determined in the Penn Coal case that the relevant de-
nominator is the entire bundle of rights in the legally-recognized estate
that the owner held. The consequence was that while regulations might
produce considerable diminution in value in some instances, in no in-
stance did it approach one hundred percent. This has made it easier for the
Court to avoid finding a taking on the basis of this factor alone. Between
1922 and 1991, the Supreme Court had never found that a regulation con-
stituted a taking solely on the basis of the degree of diminution in value.
As we shall shortly see, that history ended with the Court&apos;s 1992 decision
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.21
111. 1987 - a Takings Revolution?
The Big Picture began to change with the Supreme Court&apos;s 1987 Term,
although, as I will argue, there is reason to doubt that a &quot;revolution&quot; had
occurred in takings jurisprudence. Three major doctrinal developments in
the Supreme Court&apos;s post-1987 takings jurisprudence warrant special at-
tention. These are (1) the rise of conceptual severance; (2) the broadening
of the physical occupation factor; and (3) the emergence of a new per se
rule in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.
A. The Rise of Conceptual Severance
&quot;Conceptual severance,&quot; a term first coined by Margaret Jane Ra-
d i n,22 refers to the idea that each incident or set of incidents of owner-
ship in the bundle of rights itself constitutes a fully protectable property
interest. If accepted, this idea obviously would enormously broaden the
reach of the takings clause. Conceivably, e v e ry regulation which does
not fit into a properly defined nuisance exception could be viewed as a
taking under this theory.23
21 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
22 Margaret Jane R a d i n, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1676 (1988).
23 Indeed, this is the gist of the argument put forward in Richard A. E p s t e 1 n, Tak-
ings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, MA 1985).
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Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court had pretty clearly rejected con-
ceptual severance.24 The 1987 Term cases sent mixed signals about the fu-
ture of conceptual severance. On the one hand, Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenediCtiS25 seemed squarely to reject the idea. Quoting
from its earlier decision in Andrus v. Allard, the Court stated: &quot;[W]here
an owner possesses a full &apos;bundle&apos; of property rights, the destruction of
one strand of the &apos;bundle&apos; is not a taking because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety.&quot;26
On the other hand, two other decisions from the same Term indicated
that the Court was indeed prepared to apply the conceptual severance
technique. In Hodel v. I-rving,27 the Court struck down a federal statute
which. provided that upon the death of the owner of an excessively frac-
tionated undivided ownership share in tribal Indian lands allotted to indi-
viduals, the interest shall not pass either to the deceased owner&apos;s devisees
or heirs but instead shall escheat to the tribe whose land it originally
was.28 Characterizing the statute as a total restriction on the power to
control the disposition of property at death, the Court ruled that it con-
stituted an uncompensated, and therefore unconstitutional, taking of
property. The right to pass on property at death, the Court said, is among
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly char-
acterized as property.&quot;29
The other case in which the Court employed a form of the conceptual
severance technique is First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles.30 There the Court held that a landowner was en-
titled to damages in an inverse condemnation action when an ordinance
temporarily deprived the owner of all economically viable use. The ordi-
nance, while not stating any durational limit, was rescinded after it was ju-
dicially declared to constitute an unconstitutional taking. The rescission,
the Court held, did not deprive the owner of its right to recover damages
24 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
26 Id. at 497, quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65 -66.
27 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
28 The purpose of this statute was to facilitate prudent leasing and management of In-
dian land by reconsolidating multiple small fractionated interests. Without such reconsoli-
dation, Congress felt, efficient management and use of the land would likely be frustrated
by coordination problems.
29 107 S. Ct at 2083.
30 482 U.S. 304 (1&quot;7).
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for the period of time when the ordinance was in effect. Temporary tak-
ings, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, have the same status as permanent
ones because for the period in question it i s permanent. This is t e m p o -
r a 1, or durational, as distinguished from f u n c t i o n a I conceptual sever-
ance. The bundle of rights is sliced into temporal shares, each of which is
a whole &quot;thing.&quot; As Frank Michelman has pointed out, this &quot;esta-
blishe[s] a major new beachhead in takings jurisprudence for conceptual
severance.&quot;31 It does not take a great deal of effort to imagine the same
technique - divided into discrete segment ownership interests that are for-
mally undivided - being* used to extend the functional version of concep-
tual severance much more broadly than the Court did in Hodel v. Irving,
in effect repudiating its disavowal of conceptual severance in both Penn
Central and in a case decided the same Term as First English, Keystone Bi-
turninous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.32 The Court has not yet taken
that step, and perhaps it will not do so. It could fairly easily distinguish
First English from the more typical situation by relying on an interpreta-
tion that M i c h e I in a n has offered. According to M i c h e I in a n,33 what
was crucial to the decision in First English was the fact that the ordinance,
as enacted, had an indefinite duration and, therefore, w o u I d have ef-
fected a total taking without any offer of compensation. &quot;Such behavior
on the part of government,&quot; M i c h e I m a n states, &quot;is (by hypothesis) un-
constitutional and lawless.1134
Nonetheless, I do not think that we ought to dismiss out of hand any
likelihood that the present Court will extend its use of conceptual sever-
ance. As Michelman emphasized, the majority in First English in-
cluded justice Brennan, the author of three opinions that explicitly re-
jected conceptual severance - the majority opinions in Penn Central and
Andrus v. Allard and a concurring opinion in Hodel v. Irving affirming
the continued vitality of Andrus. The majority also included justices
White, Blackmun, and Marshall, all of whom had joined Brennan in Penn
Central and Andrus. None of those four justices is on the present Court,
and at least some of their replacements - justice Thomas leaps most
quickly to mind - may well be more favorably disposed to extending the
reach of conceptual severance. At least three members of the Court now
can probably be counted as firm conceptual severance supporters: Chief
31 Frank M i c h e I m a n, Takings 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1617-1618 (1988).
32 480 U.S.470, 496-498 (1987).
33 Michelman, note 31, 1619-1621.
34 Id. at 1619.
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. justice O&apos;Connor used
it in Irving and might be inclined to apply it again under the right circum-
stances. That leaves us just one short of a conceptual severance majority.
Stay tuned.
B. The Broadened Physical Occupation Factor:
The Nollan-Dolan Doctrine
The second major post-1987 development concerns the physical occu-
pation factor. Since 1987, the Supreme Court has sent several signals indi-
cating that it may be prepared to expand somewhat the physical-occupa-
tion category of regulatory takings. The most important of these signals is
the development of the Nollan-Dolan doctrine.
The doctrine concerns a practice that has been quite common in cities
throughout the country in recent years-exactions. Exactions are conces-
sions that cities extract from landowners who wish to change the use of
their land in some way and are required to obtain the city&apos;s permission to
do so. The typical scenario involves an application for a development per-
mit which the city conditions on the landowner&apos;s agreeing to dedicate a
portion of her land to some public use. The ostensible purpose of the ex-
action to minimize the negative externalities of the proposed develop-
ment.35 Clearly, though, their increased popularity reflects the fact that
few cities today can afford to pay for public dedications of private land.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,36 the Court for the first
time imposed a requirement that there be an &quot;essential nexus&quot; between
the purpose of an exaction and the purpose that would be served by de-
nying the requested development permit. Then, 1994, the Court in Dolan
v. City of Tigard37 added to this doctrine the further requirement that a
11
rough proportionality&quot; exist between the exaction and the expected im-
pact of the proposed development. The city, moreover, is assigned the
burden of proving that this proportionality exists.
These two requirements have cast doubt on the viability of exactions
generally. Commentators have suggested that the doctrine will be means
35 On exactions, both generally and in relation to the Nollan-Dolan doctrine, see Doug-
las T K e n d a I I / E. Ry a n, Paying for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Ex-
actions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1801 (1995); Stewart E. Sterk,
Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1731 (1988).
36 483 U.S.825 (1987).
37 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
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for constitutionalizing a wide variety of disputes between local govern-
ments and landowners concerning land development38 and severely limit-
ing the flexibility of local governments to regulate land use in the public
interest.
All of this may yet come to pass, but there are reasons to think that the
reach of the new doctrine is more limited. Both cases involved exactions
that authorized the public to enter private land over which the owners
had previously had an unlimited right to exclude. In Nollan, the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission required the owners of beachfront property to
permit the public to cross laterally across their private stretch of beach, lo-
cated between two state parks. The requirement in effect exacted a public
easement of way, an action that if done directly clearly would have re-
quired compensation. In Dolan, the city conditioned a permit to expand
the owner&apos;s store and parking lot on dedicating a portion of the land to
the city for the purposes of creating a pedestrian and bicycle path and a
flood control greenway. As in Nollan, the exaction would have had the ef-
fect of restricting the owner&apos;s power to exclude the public from her land.
Both decisions, then, reflect, as Frank M i c h e I m a n stated with respect
to Nollan, &quot;the talismanic force of &apos;permanent physical occupation&apos; in
takings adjudication. -39 To date, there has been no indication that the
Court would apply the same heightened scrutiny where the government
condition does not interfere with the landowner&apos;s right to exclude.40
Further evidence that the Court seems not prepared to launch a massive
expansion of the physical occupation category, subject to a rigid per se
rule, is its decision in Yee v. City of Escondito.41 That case involved a mo-
bile home rent control ordinance. California state law restricts the ability
of owners of mobile home parks to order, while the rental agreement is
still in effect, the removal of a mobile home upon its sale. The combined
effect of that law with a local rent control ordinance, the park owner
argued, was to constitute a taking by physical occupation. The Supreme
Court disagreed, emphasizing that there was no &quot;compelled physical oc-
cupation&quot; here. It is, the Court stated, the &apos;element of required acquies-
38 See Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and the Fed-
eral Constitution, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 992, 992-993 (1989).
39 Michel man, note 31, 1608.
40 See Eric T. F r e y f o g I e, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L.
Rev. 77, 87 N.41 (1995).
41 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
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cence [that] is at the heart of the concept of occupation.&quot;42 The exactions
involved in Nollan and Dolan were both of the type that could easily be
viewed as &quot;required acquiescence&quot; of just that sort, but many other mu-
nicipal exactions cannot. It seems unlikely, then, that the Nollan-Dolan
doctrine will put an end to that practice.
C. Another Categorical Rule (Sort of):
Lucas and Total Economic Deprivations
The final development is one that has received the greatest public atten-
tion. It may also be the one that has the least practical effect. In Lucas v.
Soutb Carolina Coastal Commission,43 the Court concluded that environ-
mental regulations that deprive the landowner of all economically viable
use are per se takings unless the intended use constituted a public nuisance
under what the Court called &quot;relevant background principles.&quot; Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia stated: &quot;Where the State seeks to sustain
regulations that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think
it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner&apos;s estate shows that the proscribed. use interests
were not part of his title to begin with.&quot;44 In other words, the state, to
avoid a compensation obligation, must locate some land-use prohibitions
existing in the historical common law of nuisance and link that pro-
hibition with the use proscribed by the challenged regulation.
There are a host of problems with Justice Scalia&apos;s analysis, as several
commentators have effectively pointed oUt.45 The point that I wish to em-
phasize here is that Lucas&apos; categorical rule may not amount to all that
much if it is confined to the unusual circumstance of a judicial finding of
fact that the regulation deprived the owner of a I I economically viable use
and if the Court does not broaden that circumstance through a more ex-
tensive use of the conceptual severance technique. The real significance of
Lucas may be less its practical effect that the signal it sends regarding the
current Court&apos;s desire to remold takings law along more formal lines. The
Rehnquist Court seems increasingly impatient with the open-ended bal-
42 Id. at 1528.
43 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
44 112 S. Ct. at 2899 (footnote omitted).
45 For trenchant criticisms of Lucas, see Freyfogle, note 40, 118-127; William W.
F i s h e r I I I, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1993); John A. Hu in b a c h,
Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1993).
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ancing approach of Penn Central. Lucas and Dolan may indicate that the
Court is responding positively to calls from some commentators for &quot;a
good dose of formalization. &quot;46
Conclusion
Is it fair to characterize the Court&apos;s post-1987 takings decisions as con-
stituting a &quot;revolution&quot; in takings jurisprudence? I think not. The basic
structure and substance of the doctrine have remained largely intact. But
clearly things are changing. Structurally, the doctrine is increasingly be-
coming formalized. Substantively, the new formality has enhanced the
takings clause&apos;s role in restricting the power of state and local govern-
ments. Once a backwater of constitutional law, the takings clause has
emerged as one of the Rehnquist Court&apos;s main tools for constructing the
minimal state. No one interested in American public law can afford any
longer to ignore it.
46 Susan R o s e - A c k e r ni a n, Against Ad Hockery, 88, Colum. L. Rev. 1697, 1700
(1988).
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